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Non-performing Loan and its Effects on Banking
Stability: Evidence from National and
International Licensed Banks
in Nigeria
Ngozi V. Atoi1
This study examines Non-Performing Loan (NPL) and its effects on the stability of Nigerian banks with national and international operational licenses
from 2014:Q2 to 2017:Q2. A “restricted” dynamic GMM is employed to estimate the macroeconomic and bank specific drivers of NPL for each licensed
category. Z-Score is constructed to proxy banking stability, and its response
to shocks NPLs is examined in a panel vector autoregressive framework. The
results reveal that drivers of NPLs vary across the two categories of banks,
but, weighted average lending rate is a vital macroeconomic driver of NPLs
for both. The results also confirm the moral hazard hypothesis and riskreturn tradeoff of efficient market theory. Furthermore, international banks
withstand NPLs shocks in the long run, despite temporary flux in the short
horizon, while the stability of national banks is susceptible to NPLs shocks in
the long run. The study recommends that weighted average lending rate, anchored on monetary policy rate should be the focus of banks’ regulators when
addressing issues of NPLs. Again, strategies for mitigating short run impacts
of NPLs on the stability of international licensed banks should be incorporated
in the off-site regulatory framework to ensure banking stability.
Keywords: Banking System Stability, Non-performing Loan, Panel Generalized
Methods of Moments, Panel Vector Autoregressive .
JEL Classification: G210, C330, C360.
DOI: 10.33429/Cjas.09218.3/6

1.0 Introduction
Nonperforming loans (NPLs) and Banking system stability nexus continues to
gain more research attention, especially after the 2008/2009 global financial crisis
(GFC) that led to credit crisis in most economies. Eonomies that were running on
1
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a booming banking sector during pre-crisis period were forced to a sudden credit
growth halt in 2008 (IMF, 2012). Measures were adopted to mitigate the effects
of NPLs on Banking stability in the wake of the GFC.

In Nigeria, apart from establishing a special purpose vehicle to manage the buildup
of NPLs, commercial banking operations were streamlined by the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) to provide clarity on the conduct of commercial banking activities
with respect to geographical coverage, among others. The policy ushered in commercial banks with international, national and regional operational licenses.2 As
the names imply, a commercial bank with international license is allowed to maintain offshore banking operation in the jurisdiction of its choice within and across
the national boundaries; a national licensed bank carries out banking operations
within national boundaries while regional licensed banks operate within specified
geographical locations in Nigeria. The repositioning ensured that banks’ operational coverage is commensurate to their paid-up share capital. These measures
put in place to address the ailing capital structure attributable to NPLs impacted
the banking system positively up to end 2014.

In recent times, NPLs has been trending and becoming a cause of concern for
banks’ stability in the face of reeling economic downturn. In CBN (2015), the
banking industry: large, medium and small bank groups showed vulnerability to
the most severe shock of 200 per cent rise in NPLs, but none of the groups could
sustain the impact of the same magnitude of shocks in December 2016 as their
post-shock capital adequacy ratios fell below the 10 per cent minimum prudential
requirement (CBN, 2016). Oftentimes, the same prudential tools such as liquidity
ratio, loans to deposit ratio, large exposure and reserve requirements have been
applied to address issues of NPLs of banks, irrespective of size. Two questions are
relevant here: first, do NPLs of all categories of operational licenses respond to
the same drivers?; second, are the responses of banking stability to NPLs shocks
2

The classification of banks into international, national and regional is
analogous to bank size in most literature and the source document of
this classification can be found in the CBN website through the URL:
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2010/circulars/bsd/commercial
%20banking%20licensing%20regulations%20-%20final%20released.pdf
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across these bank categories the same? The efficacy of the prudential tools may be
unrealized if not administered in line with a firm understanding of specific factors
of NPLs.
Some studies have argued that NPLs and its impact on banking stability cannot
be the same across different categories of banks due to varied levels of market
discipline, risk management strategies, regulatory and supervisory measures, and
sources of capital (Detragiache and Gupta (2006), Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010) and Bertay et al. (2013)).
Most empirical studies on NPLs and banking stability nexus in Nigeria have neglected the idiosyncratic or heterogeneity characteristics of these banks with respect to operational coverage (Kanu and Himliton (2014), Akinlo and Mofoluwaso
(2014), Kolapo et al. (2012), Onwe (2015) and Mensah and Adjei (2015)). Thus,
the two fundamental areas our study is contributing to existing literature in Nigeria
are: (i) accounting for geographical coverage of banking activities and (ii) employing more robust analytical methods.
The objective of this study is to estimate the factors influencing NPLs and also
investigate the feedback effect of shocks to NPLs on stability of banks with international and national authorization. To achieve these objectives, first, macroeconomic and bank specific predictors of NPLs for each banking category are estimated using a restricted dynamic GMM one step technique. Second, we extract
the response of banks stability (Z-score) to NPLs shocks in a panel vector autoregressive framework. The regional banks are not considered in this study due to
their marginal size and limited years of existence.
The outcome of this study will help portfolio investment managers to minimize
risk and optimize returns; and also enhance regulatory/prudential toolkits of the
monetary authority in providing: (i) specific supervisory policies for addressing
the issues of NPLs, and (ii) policy options for mitigating impact of NPLs on the
banking system. In addition, this study seeks to bridge the identified gap in literature. The study covers the period 2014:Q2 to 2017:Q2, when the selected banks
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had consistent bank specific data with the same uniform reporting year.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section two examines some
stylized facts in the Nigerian Banking System. The conceptual framework, theoretical and empirical literature are examined in section three, while section four
focuses on methodology. Section five deals with data analysis and interpretation
of results; and finally, section six presents the conclusion and policy recommendations.

2.0 Stylised Facts on the Nigeria Banking System
Over the years, the Nigerian banking system has metamorphosed in the area of
ownership structure, operational coverage and number of institutions. Prior to
2005 banking system consolidation in Nigeria, eighty nine banks existed under a
universal banking system - a framework that placed no restrictions on banks’ share
capital investments in other financial service sectors. This led to the proliferation
of other financial institutions having banks as minority or majority shareholders and this created supervisory bottlenecks for the regulating institution due to
subsidiaries’ interconnectedness. Despite these investments and considering the
population of Nigeria, huge capital market and the overall economic activities, the
banking system was rated very marginal relative to its potential (CBN, 2009).

The ailing condition of the banks led to the consolidation of the sector in 2005
through mergers and acquisitions with the view to enhancing its efficiency, size,
and developmental roles. In the process, bank’s minimum capital was raised and
the number of banks reduced to twenty five, and this further reduced to twenty
four through market-induced merger and acquisition. The exercise, coupled with
huge inflow from oil receipts created excess liquidity in the system, a level higher
than the economy’s absorptive capacity. This led to a further investment in oil
and gas sector equities, thereby creating significant boom in the capital market.
With the arrival of 2008/2009 GFC, the oil price, as well as returns on investment
in that sector plummeted significantly and was accompanied by unprecedented
capital outflow thus throwing the banking system into a high credit risk situation.
The asset quality of Nigerian banks dropped significantly as NPLs skyrocketed
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with attendant economic consequences.
To avoid a systemic failure and revitalize the system, Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) - a special purpose vehicle was established in 2011
to take over toxic assets through issuance of bonds. Thereafter, the regulatory
authority also restrained banks from granting further credit to potential borrowers with (i) un-serviced facility exceeding a certain amount or (ii) any amount of
delinquent facility that was taken over by AMCON. To further enhance the resilience of the banking system, commercial banks which constitute the major part
of the banking system, were further categorized into regional, national and international. Each category has specified operational coverage and minimum level of
capital requirement in terms of capital base and adequacy ratios (see Table 1).

Table 1: Licensing Requirements of Commercial Bank Categories in Nigeria

However, the fall in international oil price coupled with the Nigeria Naira to US
Dollar (N/US$) exchange rate volatility undermined these measures as NPLs continued trending upward to 2017:Q1. It therefore becomes imperative to examine
NPLs and its impact on the banking system stability with particular reference to
new classification of commercial banks in Nigeria with a view to proffering appropriate specific policy measures for addressing issues of NPLs in the various banks’
categories.
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3.0 Literature Review
3.1 Conceptual Framework
Banking system is a combination of financial institutions responsible for safekeeping and lending of money and the provision of other financial services to the populace (CBN, 2016). Technically, deposit takers whose liabilities are included in the
national definition of broad money are very significant component of the banking
system. In most emerging economies where the non-bank financial institutions are
still nascent, the deposit takers component of the banking system is usually huge.
Hence, shock on asset side of a group of banks, through rising amount of NPLs in
the credit portfolio could spillover and affect the stability of the system. A good
measure of banking stability is essential for addressing issues of instability in the
system.

In most academic literature, stability of banks has been measured under CAMELS
framework by using individual indicator like return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE) (see Kolapo et al. (2012), Warue (2013), Mensah and Adjei (2015)).
Return on assets measures efficiency of deposit takers in the use of assets in generating earnings. ROA reveals how debt drives returns, the same way ROE shows
the extent of equity investment effectiveness. Banking system stability may not be
adequately captured with a single indicator because bank’s capital adequacy ratio,
for instance may not guarantee stability. Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009) note that
central banks like Czech National Bank (CNB), Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA), Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) and Swiss National Bank (SNB) are now
measuring banking stability using composite indices. Hence, a Z-score computed
with ROA and ROE could serve as a proxy for banking system stability.

Financial stability index has been found useful due to its capabilities; it mirrors
the country’s financial structure (ECB, 2007), accounts for financial innovations
(Boudebbous and Chichti, 2013), allows policy-makers to monitor the development
of stressful situations and considers the state of banks’ behaviour on individual
basis (Raluca and Dumitru, 2014). Sere-Ejembi et al. (2014) employ conference
board methodology, while Raluca and Dumitru (2014) apply Z-score that was first
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proposed by Altman (2000) and developed by Mercieca et al. (2007) to construct
banking system stability index. Schaeck (2007) argues that the main advantage of
Z-score is computational simplicity for financial institutions or corporations. Extant theories have established a connection between NPLs and banking stability,
thus, it is also imperative to understand the fundamentals of NPLs.

The concept of NPLs has been expressed by different authors in the literature. One
common feature of NPL is the period over which the principal and interest remain
unpaid and un-serviced before a loan is classified as non-performing. Caprio and
Klingebiel (1990) described NPLs as loans that do not generate income over a
sustained period of at least three months. In the same vain, Alton and Hazen
(2001) expressed NPLs as loans that are 90 days or more past due or no longer
accruing interest. The IMF Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide
of 2006 recommends that loans are classified as non-performing when payment of
principal and interest are past due by three months or more or when interest payments equalling three months interest or more have been capitalized, refinanced
or rolled over. One interesting argument put forward by the IMF Guide is that a
loan can also be classified as non-performing when the debtor files for bankruptcy.
In Nigeria, NPLs is classified into substandard, doubtful, very doubtful and lost.

3.2 Theoretical Literature
The theory of NPLs as it relates to stability of banks rests on three pillars: (i) information asymmetry, (ii) adverse selection and (iii) moral hazard theories. They
provide useful information on the traditional causes of loan default that translates
to banking system instability. Information asymmetry theory was first applied by
Akerlof (1970). The theory states that it may be complex to differentiate between
good and bad borrowers and this may lead to adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. In line with the theory, Cottarelli et al. (2005) and Kraft and Jankov
(2005) show the role of loan growth in bank risk-taking and resulting instability.
The theory also relates to contagious withdrawals when depositors are imperfectly
informed about the type of shocks hitting banks and about interbank exposures
(De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000).
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Propounded by Akerlof (1970) and later expanded by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), the adverse selection theory describes the situation where the probability of loan default increases with rising interest rate and the quality of borrowers
worsens as the cost of borrowing rises (Musara and Olawale, 2012). The theory is
founded on the assumption that banks are not certain in selecting credit-worthy
borrowers from a pool of loan seekers with different credit risk exposures ex-ante.
Thus, financial intermediaries are more likely to lend to high-risk borrowers who
are not concerned about the harsh lending conditions and are prone to loan default (Ezeoha, 2011). Pagano and Jappelli (1993) argue that information sharing
reduces adverse selection problems by enhancing information on loan applicants.
More so, Padilla and Pagano (2000) document that if banks exchange credit information on defaults, then borrowers are encouraged to apply more energy in their
projects knowing fully well that loan default carries the penalty of higher interest
rates or no future access to credit facility.

Before Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) and Stiglitz (1990) proposed moral hazard model
for credit market, Arrow (1963) documents that the phenomenon of using private
information to benefit from an incomplete contract in the presence of information
asymmetry is known as moral hazard. Musara and Olawale (2012) also noted that
moral hazard exist where the borrower of bank credit takes action that adversely
affects the returns to the lender. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) posit that a bank
that makes and sells loans is subject to a moral hazard problem with respect to
screening borrowers. The theory is based on the assumption that the likelihood
of borrowers engaging in activities that will guarantee repayment of bank credit
extended to them cannot be determined ex-post by banks.

3.3 Empirical Literature
Previous empirical findings provide evidence of varying NPLs drivers across bank
categories in emerging and advanced economies. Khemraj and Pasha (2009) employ fixed effect model and found that real effective exchange rate has a significant
positive impact on NPLs for small, medium and large banks in Guyana. In a more
detailed study, Raluca and Oaneab (2014) examined the main drivers of stability
of commercial and co-operative banks; and if these factors vary among the two
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classes of banks in Romania. The study used Z-score to proxy bank stability index. The authors fitted the macroeconomic variables spanning 2008 to 2012 on
simple regression models, one for each class of banks. The results revealed that
only GDP growth and interbank rate positively impact on co-operative bank’ stability. However, the result could not find any significant factor that could affect
the stability of commercial banks among the macroeconomic variables considered.
Ekanayake and Azeez (2015) attribute NPLs in Sri Lanka banking system to both
macroeconomic conditions and banks’ specific factors. They established that NPLs
have a positive relationship between loan to asset ratio and prime lending rate,
and argued that larger banks incur lesser loan defaults compared to smaller banks.

Some studies attributed varying NPLs drivers across banks to certain factors. According to Detragiache and Gupta (2006), larger banks with cross boarder banking
operations could manage systemic crisis better than smaller banks due to easier
source of capital in the international financial markets with less severe informational barriers in these markets. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) attributed
varying drivers of NPLs across different sizes of banks to factors such as bankcustomer relationships and ownership structure; geographic operational coverage
(regional versus national); access to external finance; capital market discipline
exposure; and differential regulatory treatment. Since NPLs vary across bank
categories, it therefore suggests that drivers of NPL could as well vary across
bank type. Recognizing these differences, Bertay et al. (2013) posit that stringent
market discipline may be necessary but not expedient for lower categories of banks.

In Nigeria, Akinlo and Mofoluwaso (2014) examine the drivers of NPLs in a
macroeconomic model using annual data. The result provides evidence of negative
relationship between economic growth and NPLs, while unemployment, credit to
the private sector and exchange rate exert positive influence on NPLs. Kanu and
Hamilton (2014) investigated macroeconomic determnants of NPLs in two fronts
by employing simple OLS regression. The study established inverse relationship
between NPLs and GDP in Nigeria. These studies did not consider classification
of banks in any form to account for peculiarity of existing banking groups. Similar studies in other climes without recourse to geographical coverage were done
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by Curak, Pepur and Poposki (2013), Nkusu (2011), Messai and Jouini (2013),
Škarica (2014) and Vasiliki et al. (2014).

On the effects of NPLs shocks on banking system stability, contemporary empirical
evidences are evidently unavailable in Nigeria, especially with respect to different
bank categories or sizes. Kolapo et al. (2012) use a sample of five commercial
banks to examine the effect of credit risk on the performance of commercial banks
in Nigeria. The results show that the effect of credit risk on bank performance is
cross-sectional invariant. Onwe (2015) investigates the relationship between liquidation and banking industry stability in Nigeria. The study used transformed
Pearson correlation coefficient to separately determine the effect of bank failure
and NPLs on the banking system stability. A long run relationship between bank
failure and stability of banking industry was established.

In other jurisdictions, the response of banking stability to NPLs across bank size
is mixed. Boyd and Prescott (1986) posit that larger banks could reduce NPLs
portfolio by diversifying loan portfolio risks more efficiently than small banks due
to higher economies of scale and scope. Boot and Thakor (2000) also argued
that larger banks tend to minimize NPLs through better credit administration
like credit rationing since fewer credit investments of a higher quality can increase
return of the singular investment and hence engenders financial soundness. Beck,
et al. (2006) found that large banks can make higher profit, which provide higher
capital buffer that mitigates effects of adverse external macroeconomic, NPLs and
liquidity shocks, thus reducing the probability of bank crisis. Liu and Wilson
(2011) found that banking stability varies across bank types, in that banks with
a regional focus are more stable on average than national banks. Laeven et al.
(2014) investigated bank systemic risk across large and small banks in 52 countries. Empirical result shows that large banks create more individual and systemic
risk than smaller banks, especially when large banks have insufficient capital or
unstable funding.

Dayong et al. (2016) conducted a follow up evaluation by examining the impact
of NPLs on bank behavior using a threshold panel regression model with dataset
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that covered sixty city commercial banks, sixteen state-owned banks and jointstock banks, and eleven rural commercial banks. The results confirmed the moral
hazard hypothesis, which suggests that an increase in the NPLs leads to more
lending risk, thus potentially stimulating more poor quality loan and financial system instability.

4.0 Methodology
To achieve the objectives of this study, the basic properties of the variables are
examined through descriptive statistics, correlation and panel unit root test of
Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002); Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003); ADFFisher Chi-square, and Philip Peron (PP). The duality of analytical framework
for estimating factors that influence NPLs and examining the impulse response of
banking stability to shocks from NPLs is utilized. In the spirit of GMM one step
technique; and considering the structure of the Nigerian economy, macroeconomic
and bank specific variables are regressed on NPLs.3 Z-Score is applied to construct
an indicator for banks stability to extricate its response to shocks in NPLs in a
panel vector autoregressive system.

4.1 Data Sources and the Selected Variables
The bank specific panel data for this study, which ranges from 2014:Q2 to 2017:Q2
were extracted from eighteen individual banks statutory returns to the regulatory authorities in Nigeria (CBN and NDIC4 ) through Financial Analysis System
(FinA) platform. The study period was carefully chosen to accommodate the periods the selected banks had consistent bank specific data with uniform reporting
year. This was done to ensure a balanced panel data structure and the banks were
further categorized into international and national operational authorization. The
macroeconomic data were sourced from the CBN statistical bulletin and National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
3

Threshold Generalized Autoregressive conditional Heteroskedasticity (TGARCH)
model with generalized error distribution was employed to generate nominal exchange
rate volatility as one of the macroeconomic variables that measures exchange rate risk.
As shown in Appendix 1, TGARCH was preferred to Exponential GARCH for modelling
exchange rate volatility.
4
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Consistent with financial theory and empirical findings as well as with peculiarities of the Nigeria economy, the bank specific variables used in the first estimation
stage are NPLs, loan growth, lending interest rate, liquidity ratio, loan to deposit
ratio and large exposure. These variables are among the policy tool kits that are
directly or indirectly under the control of monetary authorities. We examine four
critical macroeconomic variables – real GDP growth rate, nominal exchange rate,
weighted average lending rate and exchange rate volatility (exchange rate risk)–
relevant in explaining changes in NPLs. ROA, ROE and standard deviation of
ROA are used to construct Z-score (banking system stability index). Studies have
demonstrated that Z-score are more efficient proxy for financial stability than individual indicators. The expected direction of relationships (expected sign) between
these variables and NPL as well as Z-Score are presented in Appendix 2.

4.2 Model Specification
Dynamic Panel Data Model Specification
The dynamic panel data estimator is preferred to the traditional OLS fixed-effects
or random effects as the former is able to handle endogeneity issues or reverse
causality problems while the latter is proven inefficient in these areas. In other
words, the technique is more robust and efficient in the presence of multicollinearity
problem (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The framework incorporates lagged dependent variable among the regressors to account for time persistence in the structure
of the dependent variable. Considering a linear dynamic panel specification of the
form:
Yi,t = αYi,t−1 + β (L) Xi,t + ωi + εi,t , |α| < 1, i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T

(1)

The subscripts i and t represent the cross sectional and time dimension of the
panel, respectively. Y(i,t) denote the dependent variable, Y(i,t−1) is one period lag
of the dependent variable, β (L) is the 1 × k lag polynomial vector, X(i,t) is the
k × 1 vector of explanatory variables apart from the lag dependent variable. ωi are
the unobserved individual bank specific effects and εi,t are the error terms. The α
and β measure the dynamic effects of the dependent variable and other regressors

54

CBN Journal of Applied Statistics Vol. 9 No. 2 (December, 2018)

43-74

in the polynomial vector, respectively. To avoid the limitation of the baseline
model, in terms of correlation between Y(i,t−1) and ωi , the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimation technique proposed is employed. GMM estimation
technique requires a transformation of the model into a first difference in order to
eliminate individual specific effects (ωi ) and also ensure an unbiased and consistent
parameter estimates. The transformation of equation (1) is specified as:
∆Yi,t = α∆Yi,t−1 + β (L) ∆Xi,t + ∆εi,t

(2)

The symbol ∆ is a first (forward) difference operator and other subscripts are as
earlier defined. The estimation of equation (2) ushers in two levels of biases from
lag dependent and exogenous variables. Therefore, in the spirit of Arellano and
Bond (1991) one-step GMM framework, the lag dependent and independent variables are determined based on the assumption of independence and homoscedasticity of residuals and consistent parameter estimates. One-step GMM framework
is preferred in this study because Judson and Owen (1999) found that the one-step
estimator outperforms the two-step estimator. Moreso, the efficiency gain from the
two step estimator are insignificant (see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell
et al. (2000)).
Hence, in line with one-step dynamic GMM technique and consistent with related
studies (see Merkl and Stolz, (2009), Dimitrios, et al. (2010), Dimitrios, et al
(2012), Curak, Pepur and Poposki (2013) and Vasiliki, Athanasios and Athanasios (2014)), the baseline model for this study is formalized, using the selected
macroeconomic instruments, as:
l
l
l
l
l
∆N P LRi,t
= α∆N P LRi,t−1
+ β1,k
∆RGDPt + β2,k
∆IN T Rt + β3,k
∆XRVt
l
+β4,k
∆IEXRt + ∆εli,t

(3)

where i=1,2,. . . ,18 for the banks (cross sectional) and t = 1, 2, . . . , 14. The superscript l, represents category of banks’ license.
Standard errors and Sargan test are downward biased when instrument lists are
more or equal to cross sectional units (see Dimitrios, et al. (2010)). To account
for this limitation, “restricted” GMM technique5 is employed where bank specific
5

See Judson and Owen (1999) for similar application.
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variables are added to the baseline model, one at a time, represented in the form:
l
l
l
l
l
∆N P LRi,t
= α∆N P LRi,t−1
+ β1,k
∆RGDPt + β2,k
∆IN T Rt + β3,k
∆XRVt
l
l
+β4,k
∆IEXRt + β4,k
Xli,t−k + ∆εli,t

(4)

where Xli,t−k represents it h cross sectional bank specific variables at time t. Other
regressors have been defined, and notation details are shown in Appendix 2 with
summarized interpretations. The model for each type of banking license is estimated in the dynamic and the overall validity of the instruments is tested for each
model using the Sargan specification test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
and generalized by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998).

Z-Score Construction
Z score measures banking system stability and it is computed with three important soundness indicators: Equity/Assets ratio (R/E), the return on assets (ROA)
and the standard deviation of return on assets (σ(ROA)) - a proxy for return
volatility. Impliedly, Z score measures the distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952).
As formalized by Mercieca et al., (2007):
ROA + E
A
(5)
σ (ROA)
Simply put, Z-score shows by how many standard deviations ROA could change to
Z − score =

make the banks total assets fall short of its total debts. The popularity of Z-score
is derived from the established inverse relationship it has with the probability of
insolvency of financial institutions.

Panel Vector Autoregressive Model Specification
To achieve the second objective of this study, unrestricted VAR is employed to
uncover impulse responses arising from the interactions of each category of bank
stability and NPLs using the model of the form:
yi,t = B(L)yit + ei,t

(6)

where yi,t represents a kx1 vector including Z-score and NPLs.ei,t are cross-sessional
errors at time t. The dynamic relations between Z-score and NPLs are revealed
through the impulse response functions (IRFs).
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5.0 Data Analysis and Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive information in the upper part of Table 2 is quite revealing. The
mean values, which fall within the maximum and minimum values of all variables
reveals data consistency. Apart from interbank exchange rate and Z-score, the
median values suggest relatively low variability of the data as they are not significantly distinct from the mean values as confirmed by the standard deviation. This
level of variability in exchange rate provides justification for examining its second
moment relevance in the NPLs model.
Furthermore, the observed values of skewness indicate asymmetric distribution,
as none was zero and more positive than negative realizations. Apart from interest rate at the macro and bank specific levels, all other variables are right tailed.
Interestingly, only interest rate variables are much closer to normal distribution,
with kurtosis value of 3. The distribution of TLG, NPLs, LQR and EXRV are
leptokurtic. However, the Jarque-Bera statistics and the corresponding probability values confirmed that only bank specific interest rate seems to be normally
distributed.

5.2 Correlation Coefficients of Variables
The direction and strength of relationship between NPLs, macroeconomic Variables as well as bank specific variables are presented in lower panel of Table 2.
The correlation coefficients between these variables and NPLs seem to suggest
weak associationshig. The correlation coefficients between NPLs and five (5) variables (RGDP, WALR, TLG, LQR and Z-score) indicate negative relationships,
while other macroeconomic and bank-specific variables displayed positive relationship with NPLs. Correlation coefficients of all the variables with respect to NPLs
are significant at the conventional levels.

57

Initially, unemployment rate, inflation rate, broad money supply and government expenditure were considered, but later dropped
having confirmed their very strong relationship with other macroeconomic variable, which could result to multicollinearity problems in
the models. *, ** and *** imply significance levels of correlation coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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It is important to mention the observed strong positive relationship between prime
lending rate and exchange rate movements, although the direction of relationship
runs contrary to intuition as negative relationship is expected. Interestingly, the
correlation coefficient confirmed weak negative relationship between NPLs and
banking stability.

5.3 Panel Unit Root
Panel-based unit root tests are found to have higher power than individual time
series unit root tests. The null hypothesis of LLC technique assumes common
unit root process, while that of IPS, ADF and PP assumes individual unit root
process. Among the macroeconomic variables in level form, the null hypotheses of
unit root presence cannot be rejected at all conventional significance levels based
on the high probability values of test statistics, except LLC for RGDP and WALR
(see Table 3).

Table 3: Panel Unit Root Test Results

However, a different pattern is observed in terms of stationarity attributes of the
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bank specific variables in level form. When compared to results for macroeconomic
variables, bank-specific variables exhibit equal number of evidence to reject and
not to reject the null hypotheses. At first differencing of the bank specific and
macroeconomic variables, there is strong evidence, at 1% level, to reject the null
hypotheses of unit root.

5.4 Pedroni Panel Cointegration
Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration test, which extended the Engle-Granger
(1987) residual-based framework to panel data, is performed to evaluate the null
hypothesis of no cointegration of NPLs and macroeconomic variables against homogeneous (within-dimension) and heterogeneous (between-dimension) alternatives.
The Pedroni panel cointegration test results for the baseline model are presented
Table 4.

Table 4: Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test Results

Drawing from Panel and Group for PP- and ADF-Statistics, six of the eleven statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the most conservative
level of one percent (1%), giving the very small probability values. This, therefore,
establishes a long run relationship between the NPLs and macroeconomic variables
as formalized in the baseline model.
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5.5 Panel GMM Estimation of NPLs Determinants
As shown in Table 5, exchange rate movements and exchange rate risk (measured
by conditional variance of exchange rate movements) were found to be significant
determinants of NPLs of the entire banks put together (industry), but exchange
rate risk rendered NPLs non-responsive to changes in the measure of economic
activities (baseline model 1). Thus, baseline model 2 which yielded better results
in terms of parameter estimates and overall validity of the instruments employed
(Sargan test) is maintained for all other models to examine the impact of prudential tools on NPLs. Estimated parameters of panel model for the industry reveal
that macroeconomic and bank specific variables examined are significant determinants of NPLs. The parameter estimate of exchange rate risk confirm risk-return
tradeoff of efficient market theory - investment with higher risk leads to more returns, higher propensities for loan repayment and lower probability of loan default.
NPLs of banks with international authorization are not significantly affected by
exchange rate risks (baseline model 2). This is not unconnected to market information and hedging opportunities that may be available to these banks in the
world of international finance. In addition, banks with international scope may
embrace sophisticated risk management frameworks with a more robust internal
control system that makes them less vulnerable to shocks. Hence, baseline model
1, having more valid parameter estimates with more robust overall validity of the
instruments, remains the reference specification for estimating the effects of bank
specific variables. Macroeconomic variables were found to be significant drivers of
NPLs among international licensed banks in all the estimated models, except model
3 where growth in total loans was introduced, which made NPLs non-responsive to
changes in macroeconomic variable. The negative impact of real GDP growth on
NPLs as revealed in this study is contrary to the findings of Raluca and Oaneab
(2014). Furthermore, only prime lending rate among the variables specific to international licensed banks was found to be significant determinant of NPLs.
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Values in ( ) and [ ] are standard errors and probability values. The stars ***, **, and * represent levels of significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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The estimated models for banks with national authorization show interesting results. Exchange rate movements and exchange rate risks are found to affect NPLs.
Again, the risk-return tradeoff of efficient market theory is confirmed with the
significance of exchange rate risk. However, exchange rate movements suppressed
the relevance of RGDP in baseline model 2. Understandably, the opportunities
amenable to international banks are not easily accessible to these banks to adequately hedge against exchange rate movement or risk. The international banks
sometimes serve as proxy for the national licensed banks when the need arises but
such arrangements are done with some caution due to the information that could
trigger takeover, hence the outcomes are not usually profitable or beneficial to the
lower authorized banks.
Baseline model 1 with better parameter estimates and instrument validity is therefore considered as benchmark model for determining the significance of bank specific variables. Interestingly, the dynamic parameter and industry lending rate
were the significant macroeconomic variables, except for model 4 where lending
rate turned insignificant. However, industry lending rate conforms to the a priori
expectation, which is consistent with the findings of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)
that low lending rates reduces borrowing costs and leads to an increase in entrepreneurial investments in the economy with resulting decline in loan default
rates. At 10% level, liquidity ratio was found to be the only significant variable
with the expected a priori among the bank specific variables that could affect NPLs
of national banks.
It is important to note the tendency for NPLs to persist as confirmed by the significance of one period lag of NPLs in all the estimated models, confirming the
moral hazard hypothesis that an increase in the NPLs ratio raises riskier lending,
potentially leading to more toxic assets and financial instability as documented in
Dayong et al. (2016).
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5.6 Response of Banking Stability to Shocks from NPLs
Table 6 presents the information criteria for selecting optimum lag length for estimating panel vector autoregressive distributed model. Details on these criteria
are well documented in Lütkepohl (1991).

Table 6: Panel VAR Lag Order Selection

Clearly, two popular information criteria, AIC and SC, yielded conflicting lag
lengths. However, Tarun, Asani and Avanidhar (2003) had argued that in this
situation, the choice of smaller lag lengths is justified given that the gradient of
the information criterion is quite flat for larger lag lengths. On the strength of this
argument and in the spirit of parsimony, lag order 5, 3 and 2 are chosen for estimating our panel VAR model for all, international and national banks, respectively.
The estimated panel VAR models for different categories of banks are shown in
Appendix 3. Statistical significant parameters at different levels are indicated with
number of asterix. As earlier stated, this section of analysis is restricted to impulse
response of banking stability to NPLs obtained from panel VAR impulse response
function (IRF). Thus, less importance is attached to interpretation of the parameter estimates in this table. However, the stability of the estimated VAR model is
a precondition for generating reliable IRF.
Figure 1 displays inverse roots of autoregressive (AR) characteristics polynomial,
which depicts the stability of the estimated panel VAR models. Obviously, the
graphs confirm the stability or stationarity of the models as all AR roots lie inside
the unit circle, giving credence for generating their respective IRFs.
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Figure 1: VAR Model Stability Test: Inverse Root of AR Characteristic
Polynomial
Since our interest focusses on extricating banking stability response to shocks in
NPLs in various categories of banks, then the responses of NPLs and banking
stability to their own shocks as well as responses of NPLs to shocks in banking
stability are eliminated. Thus, the only relevant IRFs are presented in Figure 2,
which trace the effect of a one-time shock to NPLs innovations on current and
future behaviour of baking stability.

Figure 2: Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2S.E.
The impulse response of banking stability is examined up to tenth quarter ahead.
As clearly observed with the industry (all banks), the central line of 95% confidence level in Figure 2 lies below the horizontal line throughout. This implies that
banking stability responds negatively to one standard deviation shock in NPLs
throughout the horizon, which has significant implication for regulatory authorities. At earlier period, up to fourth quarter, one standard deviation (SD) shock
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in NPLs had little impact on banking stability, but beyond the fourth quarter,
the banking stability response to one SD shock in NPLs became excessively pronounced and highly significant. This suggests that while the industry stability may
not be threatened by impulses from NPLs in the short run, the consequences could
be devastating in the long run. Therefore, banks’ regulatory authority should focus on the appropriate regulatory tools such as the significant drivers of NPLs
earlier examined in the dynamic panel structure with the view to using these tools
to keep the trend in NPLs on the desired path, especially in the long run.

On the other hand, response of banking stability to one SD shock in NPLs was
negative up to fourth quarter and highly significant in quarter three for banks with
international operational license. The innovation from NPLs has speedy impact
on the stability of this category of banks in the short run, which should be factored
into off-site regulatory template to ensure that the banks stay above the turbulent
waters of NPLs. Interestingly, beyond quarter four, the response turned positive
in the long run. Impliedly, NPLs impulses have symmetric impact on the stability
of international banks in the short run and long run.

The impulse response function obtained from national banks reveals a seemingly
mirror image of the international bank stability to one standard deviation shocks
in NPLs. The stability of banks with national operational license responds positively to one standard deviation shock in NPLs during the first four quarters, but
entered negative region in the long run. This is quite revealing. In effect, while the
stability of international banks responds negatively in the short run and positively
in the long run to shocks in NPLs, the reverse is the case for stability of national
banks.

6.0 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Enthused by the increase in NPLs of banks and its potential threat on financial
system stability in the face of uneven recovery from economic slowdown, this study
examines the factors driving NPLs and its effects on the stability of international
and national banks in Nigeria in a panel framework. The results reveal that drivers
of NPLs vary across the two categories. Only exchange rate risk was not significant
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in the determination of NPLs of banks with international authorization, which is
not unconnected to market information and hedging opportunities available for
these banks; while prime lending rate was found to be the only significant driver
of NPLs among the variables specific to international banks. Exchange rate movements and exchange rate risks affect NPLs of banks with national license; whereas
liquidity ratio was found to be the only significant variable among the bank specific
variables.
All categories of banks confirm the moral hazard hypothesis that an increase in
the NPLs ratio raises riskier lending, thereby causing further deterioration of the
loan quality and financial system instability. Furthermore, the banking industry
and national banks confirm risk-return tradeoff of efficient market theory.
Moreover, international banks were found to withstand shocks from NPLs in the
long run, despite observed temporary flux in the short horizon; while the stability
of national banks is susceptible to NPLs shocks in the long run. Impliedly, stability of banks with international and national authorization unveiled symmetric
response to shocks in NPLs, while the industry portrays asymmetric response.
In terms of policy recommendation, weighted average lending rate, which is anchored on monetary policy rate remains the critical driver of NPLs, therefore,
monetary authority should tinker with it to keep the trend in NPLs on the desired
path. The outcomes of this study will assist in designing macro-prudential policies
in Nigeria. Specifically, banks’ regulatory authority should rely more on liquidity
ratio for tackling NPLs of national banks. National banks should provide adequate
buffers to hedge against exchange rate risk. The speedy impact on the stability
of international bank in the short run should be factored into off-site regulatory
template to ensure their stability.
In conclusion, apart from bridging the identified gap in literature, the outcome
of this research endeavor is a veritable tool for portfolio investment managers to
minimize risk and optimize returns; and enhance the regulatory/prudential toolkits of monetary authority in providing: specific supervisory policies for addressing
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NPLs; and policy options for mitigating impact of NPLs on the banking system.
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